The implications of experimental philosophy and moral psychology for the problem of free will
Elzerman, Garth Harold
The problem of free will has a long and intricate history. The millennia of development
of the problem have seen the evolution of numerous free will viewpoints. A cursory
look at the evolution of the concepts of free will and determinism, the various
arguments, counterarguments, complex adjustments to arguments, the variety of
sources of empirical research, and empirical insights illustrate the complexity of the
debate. This elaborate reality opens itself to a pluralist account of free will and moral
responsibility capable of accommodating this complexity and apparent contradiction.
In this dissertation, I present such a pluralist account. I argue that a pluralistic approach
to free will and moral responsibility makes room for discontinuities, accounts for
conflicting free will values and regret, and acknowledges dissimilar responses to moral
responsibility situations. I lay out the framework for this approach by engaging with
free will research from moral psychology, investigating the findings of the sciences,
such as neuroscience and physics, and considering our common-sense
understanding of free will.
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